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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the distributional impacts associated with "environmental gentrification" 
following the cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  By making a neighborhood more attractive, 
cleanup and reuse of LULUs may drive up local real estate prices.  Renters in the 
neighborhood would have to pay higher rents.  Moreover, existing residents may not value the 
removal of the disamenity as much as other households, creating a mismatch between their 
priorities and the new character of the neighborhood.  Thus, even if they do not move, 
existing residents, especially renters, may be harmed by the gentrification effects of cleanup. 
 
We find that even a simple economic model does not yield clear predictions on 
neighborhood effects following cleanup, except for the initial effect of rising housing values.  
In the empirical literature, we actually find conflicting evidence of rising real estate prices 
following cleanup of LULUs.  We find somewhat stronger evidence for increased housing 
density and increasing incomes, but no evidence for racial impacts.  Our review also uncovers 
a variety of factors that are likely to minimize the likelihood of gentrification or temper its 
adverse consequences. 
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I.  Introduction 
The protection of land and the cleanup of Superfund sites, brownfields, and other locally 
undesirable land uses (LULUs) is a core part of the mission of the Environmental Protection 
Agency.  To achieve the full benefits of cleanup, “reuse,” the next step of restoring these sites 
to productive uses, is increasingly an emphasis as well (Vitulli et al. 2004).  In evaluating the 
success of such programs, benefit-cost analysis naturally can play a central role, and 
accordingly EPA has recently reviewed the benefits of cleanup and reuse of Superfund sites 
(E2 Inc. 2005, US EPA 2006a,b).  However, net economic benefits cannot be the only 
criterion for planning.  Over 40 years ago, writing in the context of water programs, Maass et 
al. (1962) noted that there might be other important policy objectives, such as the distribution 
of net benefits.  They suggested that multiple objectives, rather than a single measure such as 
net benefits, be given weight in policy-making.  In some cases multiple objectives may be 
combined (as traditional benefit-cost analysis would seek to do), but in other cases 
incommensurable impacts are best left separate.2 
In that spirit, this paper reviews the distributional impacts associated with 
"environmental gentrification" (Sieg et al. 2004) following the cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  
By making a neighborhood more attractive, cleanup and reuse of LULUs may drive up local 
real estate prices.  Renters in the neighborhood would have to pay higher rents.  Moreover, 
existing residents may not value the removal of the disamenity as much as other households, 
creating a mismatch between their priorities and the new character of the neighborhood.  
                                                 
1 Spencer Banzhaf is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics, the Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, PO Box 3992, Atlanta, Ga, 30302.  Telephone: 404-651-6981.  Email: 
hsbanzhaf@gsu.edu.  Eleanor McCormick is a Research Assistant at Resources for the Future.  We thank Marie 
Howland, Robin Jenkins, Elizabeth Kopits, Sarah Beth Link, Brian Morrison, Kate Probst, David Simpson, 
Jeffrey Zabel, and especially Kris Wernstedt for comments and suggestions.  We also thank participants at an 
EPA/NCEE seminar.   
2 The same consensus was recently reached by members of a workshop on reuse of contaminated properties 
(Probst and Wernstedt 2004). 
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Thus, even if they do not move, existing residents, especially renters, may be harmed by the 
gentrification effects of cleanup.3  If many former residents do move, to be replaced by 
wealthier households, the character of the neighborhood would change further, feeding the 
gentrification.  Such environmental gentrification is a key concern of local stakeholders, as 
emphasized in a recent report from the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council 
(NEJAC) on "Unintended Impacts of Redevelopment and Revitalization Efforts" (2006).  
Nevertheless, the extent of environmental gentrification, if any, following cleanup and reuse 
of LULUs has not been solidly confirmed in the empirical literature.  This paper seeks to fill 
that void by reviewing the evidence to date. 
Wernstedt (2004) has recently identified a range of such impacts that might arise from 
cleanup and reuse of LULUs, but which would not be classified as standard economic 
benefits, and has carefully reviewed the studies and data that speak to them.  Unfortunately, as 
he notes, most studies to date have not distinguished between cleanup and reuse.  Moreover, 
few have provided insights into the distribution of the costs and benefits of cleanup and reuse.  
Indeed, Wernstedt writes in his conclusion that, of fourteen studies on land reuse, none 
examines in any great detail the distributional effects of reuse with respect to 
different segments of a community.  Yet, many contaminated properties lie in 
disadvantaged areas, where site reuse has the potential to address long-standing 
issues of local environmental and economic inequities.  Future work to clearly 
identify the communities and subpopulations that are supposed to benefit from 
the reuse of contaminated land—and to assess where the beneficial effects of 
reuse actually go—could both make explicit what often appears to be an 
implicit objective of site reuse as well as improve program initiatives to 
accomplish this objective.  Such work would require baseline documentation 
of the socio-economic composition of the communities hosting reuses and 
systematic tracking of changes in this composition and general community 
well-being. 
Although the situation is not quite as bleak, much the same could be said of our state 
of understanding of the distributional effects of cleanup as well.   
To overcome some of these limitations, in this paper we review a wider literature that 
allows us to garner insights into potential impacts.  We first take a closer look at what 
                                                 
3 Viewed in these terms, the logic of environmental gentrification is somewhat the reverse of the logic of the 
“environmental justice” literature.  If households chose to live in dirtier neighborhoods because they prioritized 
cheap housing over environmental amenities, cleaning up adverse landuses and causing prices to increase may 
work against their greatest needs. 
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sociological and economic theories say we might expect too happen under various conditions.  
We then look to empirical studies of the correlation of both land prices and demographics—
key aspects of gentrification—with land uses.  We also review a more recent economic 
literature that, while not necessarily connected to land use per se, has begun to quantify the 
connection between land prices and demographics with other social forces such as crime and 
education.   
We first find that even a simple economic model does not yield clear predictions on 
neighborhood effects following cleanup, except for the initial effect of rising housing values.  
In the empirical literature, we actually find conflicting evidence of rising real estate prices 
following cleanup of LULUs.  We find somewhat stronger evidence for increased housing 
density and increasing incomes, but no evidence for racial impacts.  Our review also uncovers 
a variety of factors that are likely to minimize the likelihood of gentrification or temper its 
adverse consequences. 
This report is divided into six sections.  Section II explores what, exactly, is meant by 
the term "gentrification" as understood from diverse perspectives and academic disciplines.  
Section III encapsulates some of these insights into an economic model that yields predictions 
about the most likely impacts from local land use changes associated with cleanup and reuse.  
(A more formal version of the model is provided in an appendix.)  Section IV begins a review 
of the relevant empirical literature, starting with “partial equilibrium studies” which capture 
one aspect of gentrification at a time.  Section V extends the review to “general equilibrium” 
studies, which have tried to capture multiple aspects of gentrification simultaneously.  
Section VI concludes. 
II.  What is Gentrification? 
Ruth Glass, a sociologist, is credited with coining the term “gentrification.”  Describing the 
metropolitan center of London in the 1960s, Glass (1964) portrayed gentrification as a process 
of invasion whereby  
one by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been 
invaded by the middle classes-upper and lower.  Shabby, modest mews 
and cottages—two rooms up and two down—have been taken over, 
when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive 
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residences.  Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or 
recent period…have been upgraded once again….Once this process of 
'gentrification' starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of 
the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social 
character of the district is changed.  (xviii-xix) 
Thus, class and class change are at the center of Glass’s work and remain so in contemporary 
definitions and studies of gentrification.  Nevertheless, contemporary definitions and popular 
understandings have evolved and expanded over the years. 
Hallmarks of Gentrification 
Today, the concept of gentrification has spread into many disciplines and into popular 
discourse.  Writers across disciplines, and even within them, would not agree on everything 
that is meant by the term "gentrification."  Nevertheless, most would agree on three 
hallmarks:  rising property values and rental costs; new construction or renovation upgrading 
the housing stock and perhaps converting it from rental to owner-occupied units; and a 
turnover in the local population bringing in residents with a higher socioeconomic status.4  
Their new economic status also may bring changes in the racial or ethnic composition of the 
neighborhood, sometimes creating tensions along these lines (Levy et al. 2006). 
Economists have generally stressed the market forces that link many of these 
characteristics together.  As a neighborhood becomes more desirable for some reason, more 
households, including wealthier ones, desire to live there.  This increased demand for space 
increases real estate prices to a level that the wealthier households can afford, but that 
previous residents might not.  The wealthier households, in turn, can also afford to improve 
their living environments in both size and appearance, and so they renovate their property.  
This renovation then further increases housing costs, reinforcing the trend. 
Sociologists emphasize these market forces as well, but also describe an aesthetic 
process.  Sharon Zukin (1987), in an excellent introduction to the topic, notes that while 
gentrification can involve new development, often it involves the renovation or rehabilitation 
of historic buildings.  As with Glass's Victorian mansions, this renovation reflects the 
                                                 
4 This may be accompany abnormal rates of turnover in a rapidly changing neighborhood, but not necessarily.  
Nationally, almost half of all households move within a five-year period.  Such a baseline rate of mobility may 
be sufficient to bring about a changing character.   
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preferences of specific demographic groups for the architecture in the gentrifying 
neighborhood.  Furthermore, historic preservation ordinances may solidify the process.   
Where various depictions of gentrification differ the most is in their understanding and 
description of the indirect effects that new demographic groups, with their new aesthetic 
tastes, have on the characteristics of the neighborhood.  At the simplest level, the 
demographic changes themselves may represent a new aesthetic.  If racial or socioeconomic 
groups have differing preferences for the racial or socioeconomic makeup of the 
neighborhood (perhaps preferring to live with people like themselves), initial demographic 
changes would fuel further changes in the demographic composition.  (See the economic 
literature on “endogenous” racial amenities and sorting, e.g. Bayer et al. 2003, 2005, Sidon 
2005, Schelling 1969.)   
Sociologists tend to stress the character of the community that different groups create, 
giving more content to the economists' model.  Some highlight gentrification as the arrival of 
yuppies.  Others stress the arrival of a more bohemian culture.  For instance, Zukin (1987) 
describes gentrification as a radical break with suburbia, “a movement away from child-
centered households toward the social diversity and aesthetic promiscuity of city life” 
(p. 131).   
These new groups may have tastes for different private goods.  Thus, another aesthetic 
aspect of gentrification is the change in the character of local retail and other services.  
O’Sullivan (2005) develops an economic model in which low- and high-income residents 
consume distinctive private goods.  As more high-income residents move in, local provision 
of their good increases (more coffee shops, florists, book stores), making the neighborhood 
more attractive to those households and again reinforcing the demographic shift.5  O’Sullivan 
calls this the "Starbucks effect."   
Other indirect affects of demographic changes in the community may include changes 
in the crime rate or quality of local public schools.  Crime may first increase following 
gentrification, as increased inequality creates more tension (associated with violent crime) and 
new targets for property crime.  The former effect in particular appears strong in the data 
                                                 
5 Although these are private goods for all practical purposes, technically small economies of scale in production 
induce some publicness, with the goods only provided if local demand is high enough.   
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(Blau and Blau 1982, Morgan 2000).  Consistent with these findings, some have suggested 
that the first wave of gentrifiers has a high tolerance for crime (Skogan 1986, Zukin 1987).6  
In the longer run, as the gentrification process continues, crime would be expected to 
decrease.  Likewise, local school quality might improve, via the peer-group effect in which 
the higher educational attainment of wealthier families spill over to other children as well.7   
A Case Study of Portland, Oregon 1990-2000 highlights many of these changes, 
including changes in racial composition, income composition, and housing prices.  
Specifically, the average number of blacks per central city tract decreased, while elsewhere 
the number of black persons increased; simultaneously, households with at least twice the 
poverty income increased.  Median housing prices increased by a factor of 3.4 in the inner 
city and 2.6 in the rest of the city.  In addition, crime decreased by 49% in the inner city but 
only 5% in the rest of the city (O’Sullivan, 2005).  A case study of Boston from 1970 to 1998 
found influxes of college-educated households in gentrifying areas, but found city-wide 
increases in land values.  It concluded that the effects had more to do with metro-wide 
changes in the income distribution than with local amenities (Vigdor 2002).   
While this study has examined a generally gentrifying city, one final part of 
gentrification is the fate of other areas that do not gentrify.  Gentrification’s contribution to 
increased homelessness and trends in displacement has long been a contentious area of study 
(Zukin 1987).  One of these displacement phenomena is termed the mismatch hypothesis, in 
which a mismatch of skills of previous blue-collar residents and the requirements of new 
white-collar jobs leads to unemployment or migration (Frey, 1979).  Zukin (1987) emphasizes 
that gentrification can take place alongside areas that continue to deteriorate.  Glass (1964) 
similarly saw, in 1960s London, “pockets of blight” (p. xx) growing more dense and areas 
where “change and stagnation exist side by side” (p. xxv).  On this reading, as low-cost 
                                                 
6 This finding is confirmed by information on residents’ reactions and opinions to their newly resettled homes 
and neighborhoods as solicited in both the Mount Pleasant and Capitol Hill neighborhoods in Gale’s (1976-77) 
survey of Washington DC.  Even with a majority of respondents, within each of these area studies, reporting 
personal victimization, in or related to a criminal incident and unease pertaining to the level of criminal activity, 
“most saw it as a necessary price to pay in order to enjoy the attributes of inner-city living” (Laska and Spain, 
1980, p. 102). 
7 But, as Vigdor (2002) notes, if gentrifying households do not have children, they would have little impact on 
schools.   
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neighborhoods gentrify, poorer residents have fewer options, and so pack into remaining poor 
neighborhoods more densely. 
Theories of Neighborhood Change 
These various hallmarks of gentrification receive greater or less weight, or are 
described in different terms, according to different theories of neighborhood change.  In 
addition to neoclassical economics, five social theories of neighborhood change serve as 
paradigms for descriptions of gentrification (Liu 1997 and Zukin 1987).  The five theories are 
the invasion-succession model, the neighborhood life-cycle model, the push-pull model, the 
institutional theory of neighborhood change, and a Marxist-materialist perspective.  Most of 
these theories have components that resonate with neoclassical economics as well; 
accordingly we discuss economic theories along side the sociological. 
Associated with the Chicago school of human ecology, the classical invasion-
succession model is based on an ecological process in which a new plant invades a habitat and 
replaces previous plants as the dominant species, only to be itself replaced by a later invasion.  
This process, according to the theory, is mirrored in human society, with succeeding 
demographic waves cascaded over a neighborhood.  This may well be what Glass (1964) had 
in mind when describing gentrification as an "invasion."  In Liu’s (1997) analysis of the 
theory, the invasion-succession model implies that relationships between races will be 
characterized by competition, conflict, and accommodation. 
The neighborhood life-cycle model, originally formulated by Hoover and Vernon 
(1959), as cited in Liu, also views neighborhood change as a natural process.  Here, the 
analogy is to generational succession rather than ecological succession.  As a housing stock 
ages, it becomes less desirable, leading to successive in-migration of lower socioeconomic 
groups that are willing to occupy it at reduced costs.  Eventually, when it deteriorates to a 
critical point, the housing stock is recycled and renewed.  Economists will recognize in this 
perspective a “filtering” model or a model of the optimal timing of investment (e.g. Brueckner 
and Rosenthal 2005, Rosenthal 2006, Somerville and Holmes 2001).  As a young housing 
stock first begins to age, renovating it requires high fixed costs and only modest returns.  
Eventually, as it continues to age, it reaches a point at which investment is economical.  This 
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process has been confirmed in empirical work by Helms (2003), who finds age a significant 
factor in the prediction of housing renovation.   
This life-cycle perspective is important for understanding the potential consequences 
of decontamination and reuse of LULUs.  If local land prices and the socioeconomic status of 
local residents are correlated with LULUs primarily through mutual correlation with the age 
of a neighborhood, removal of the LULU would not reverse the basic phenomenon, and 
gentrification would be less likely to occur. 
A third theory, the so-called push-pull model, focuses on two related forces.  The 
pushing force includes neighborhood disamenities that make a neighborhood less desirable for 
residence, such as existing (or planned) LULUs.  The pulling forces are amenities, those 
things that might draw a person to reside in a given neighborhood, for example parks or 
employment opportunities.  The push force motivates households to relocate, and they then 
choose a new neighborhood based on its pulling factors (e.g. Frey 1979).  Applied to land 
uses, this theory interprets the cleanup of a LULU as pulling in those who are attracted to the 
new set of amenities and pushing out those who cannot afford to stay (see Liu 1997).  Clearly, 
the sociologists' push-pull model is quite close to neoclassical economic models of 
neighborhood choice, in which households choose where to live based on the balancing of 
prices and desirable and undesirable features.  One difference, however, is that economists 
would tell a story of simultaneous push and pull forces.  Households may decide to relocate 
based on changing pull factors elsewhere, even without new push factors in their current 
neighborhood.  This increases the prospects for environmental gentrification, since cleanup 
and reuse will be a pull factor for many residents. 
Fourth, the institutional theory indicates that institutions, including universities, banks, 
and insurance companies, play a large role in the status of a neighborhood as they make their 
location, economic, and political decisions.  Banks, for example, can consign a neighborhood 
to decline through the practice of “redlining," in which they refuse to finance mortgages or 
home equity loans in a neighborhood, a practice emphasized by NEJAC (2006).  According to 
the institutional theory, amenities or push-pull factors have only a minor role to play.  Thus, 
LULUs would not necessarily be obstacles to neighborhood stability and do not necessarily 
lead to neighborhood decline.  Reuse, on the other hand, would not be expected to occur in 
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redlined areas, as it is often connected to large investments, in some cases backed by public 
subsidies or insurance (Wernstedt, Meyer, and Yount 2003).   
A fifth and final perspective comes from Marxism, where gentrification is a 
manifestation of the propensity for capital to reproduce itself.  Zukin (1987) writes that, 
according to this perspective,  
in our time, capital expansion has no new territory left to explore, so it 
redevelops, or internally dedifferentiates, urban space.  Just as the frontier 
thesis in US history legitimized an economic push through ‘uncivilized’ lands, 
so the urban frontier thesis legitimizes the corporate reclamation of the inner 
city from racial ghettos and marginal business uses. (Zukin, 1987, p. 141) 
From the materialist viewpoint, such expansion might also partly explain conversion of rental 
units to owner-occupied units.  Again Zukin: 
As a form of homeownership, gentrified dwellings are both a means of 
accumulation and a means of social reproduction for part of the highly 
educated middle class.  Moreover, as a reference to specific building types in 
the center of the city, gentrification connotes both a mode of high status 
cultural consumption and the colonization of an expanding terrain by economic 
institutions [and employment] associated with the service sector. (Zukin, 1987, 
p. 144)  
Thus, the expansion of capital into the neighborhood may represent the accumulation of 
wealth, or it may represent the social expansion of capitalists.  In any case capitalists are 
simply doing what capitalists do.   
Although there are many perspectives and ways of describing gentrification, most 
authors appear to agree on the main signs and indicators.  Thus, an operational and widely 
accepted definition of gentrification might read as follows.  Gentrification is a phenomenon 
with many reinforcing characteristics, incorporating three hallmarks of community change:  
rising property values and rental costs; renewal or creation of housing stock corresponding to 
the appreciation of housing values; and changes in demographic composition, especially 
economic status but perhaps affecting race, education, and household size as well.  A fourth 
set of issues, differing more widely from case to case and writer to writer, is the formation of 
new amenities, including the aesthetic feel of a neighborhood, its crime rate, and its school 
quality.  
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III.  A Conceptual Framework for Gentrification 
Many of the most salient features of gentrification can be captured in an economic model of 
household choice for communities.  In particular, models that follow the insight of Tiebout 
(1956), in which households "vote with their feet" and select communities providing their 
preferred level of amenities and housing costs, can predict community impacts following 
changes in public goods, such as the cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  Of this class of models, 
we use one introduced by Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), a more general version of which 
has been estimated econometrically by Epple and Sieg (1999) and applied to environmental 
improvements by Sieg et al. (2004) and Walsh (2004).  Banzhaf and Walsh (2006) and Vigdor 
(2006) use this model to gain insights into environmental gentrification.  The results presented 
here are derived in Banzhaf and Walsh.  In the appendix to this paper, we represent this model 
formally and derive mathematically the key insights discussed here.8 
In this model, households differ by their income and by their tastes for public 
goods/bads, including contamination or visual disamenities like brownfields.  Consequently, 
they also differ by their willingness to pay, in terms of higher housing prices, for bundles of 
public goods.  However, they do not differ in how they value one particular public good (like 
parks and green spaces, say) relative to another (like public safety).  Because of the latter 
simplifying assumption, households agree on their rankings of “most desirable” communities.  
Because of the higher demand for housing there, housing prices are highest in the most 
desirable communities; likewise, they are lowest in the least desirable.  And because 
households do differ in their willingness to trade off housing prices for public goods, these 
price differentials lead households to select different communities.  Holding tastes constant, 
richer households will be in the nicer communities and poorer households in the less desirable 
communities.   
Figure 1 illustrates the situation.  The figure shows two demographic types (differing 
by race, for example, or educational attainment) with different income distributions.  The two 
curves in the figure are their respective density functions, with Type 2 being wealthier on 
                                                 
8 This section and the appendix are written in parallel.  Thus, readers wishing to skip the mathematical details 
may safely read this section and skip the appendix, those interested in the mathematical version may do the 
opposite. 
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average than Type 1.  Type 2 households may be white for example and Type 1 minority; or 
Type 2 may be college-educated and Type 1 not.   
Holding tastes constant, the income threshold Y separates them into two different 
communities: all those with incomes above Y  are in the more desirable of two communities, 
all those with incomes below Y  are in the less desirable.  In the case depicted, the more 
desirable of the two communities also has more Type 2 households.  This follows logically in 
the case of symmetric distributions and will be true in practice in most cases.  However, it is 
not guaranteed.  If the Type II pdf had a thicker tail and Y  were moved to the left, one could 
imagine the less desirable community, while still poorer, having more Type II people.  This 
case would represent an upper-middle class minority neighborhood for example.   
The question we seek to answer with this model is what happens to a community, and 
to other communities, when its public goods improve, as when LULUs are cleaned up and 
returned to productive uses.  Consider an improvement in Community 1.  After the 
improvement, households who were somewhat indifferent before will now clearly prefer 
Community 1.  As depicted in Figure 2, Y  will shift to the right.  All the people who 
preferred Community 1 will continue to prefer it, but now additional people (represented by 
the shaded area in the figure) will as well.  In other words, the demand for housing in 
Community 1 will increase and the demand for housing in Community 2 will fall.  This will 
have the effect of increasing the population of Community 1 and decreasing the population of 
Community 2.9  Other things equal, it will also have the effect of increasing housing prices in 
Community 1 and lowering them in Community 2.  We thus have two clear hypotheses:  
Housing prices and population will both increase following cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  
The former, at least, is one hallmark of gentrification. 
What about the demographic composition of the communities?  Note that the people in 
the shaded area, those who previously preferred Community 2 but now prefer Community 1, 
are richer on average than the original residents of Community 1.  When they move in 
following the cleanup of the LULU, they will thus increase the average income of 
Community 1.  However, note that these people were poorer on average than those who 
                                                 
9 This increase in population density could follow the development of undeveloped land, rezoning developments 
for more dense uses, and/or changes in vacancy rates.  To the extent these mechanisms are restricted, changes in 
population density likewise would be restricted and price effects would be greater. 
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remain in Community 2.  Accordingly, the average income of Community 2 will increase as 
well!10  While we can thus hypothesize an increase in income following cleanup and reuse of 
LULUs, another hallmark of gentrification, this hypothesis is harder to test in the data, since 
the process involves movement of supposedly “control” communities in the same direction.  
However, as discussed by Banzhaf and Walsh (2006), it should be possible to detect this 
effect in some special cases.   
Finally, we cannot say anything about the change in the composition of Community 1 
with respect to other demographic variables.  Common sense seemingly suggests that as 
income increases, demographic groups associated with higher incomes should increase as 
well.  However, that need not be the case.  If the ratio of Type 1 households to Type 2 
households among those moving into Community 1 (the gray area) is greater than the ratio 
among those previously living in Community 1 (to the left of the original Y ), then 
Community 1’s share of Type 1 households could increase, even while getting richer.  Thus, 
this additional hallmark of gentrification—where it is associated with certain demographic 
groups, whether it be whites, more educated individuals, “urban” sophisticates, Yuppies, or 
something else—is the least likely to result from cleanup and reuse of LULUs and the least 
likely to be found in empirical studies. 
To summarize this section, even a fairly simple Tiebout model does not yield clear 
predictions about the effects on a neighborhood of cleanup and reuse, except for rising 
population densities and housing prices and, to a lesser extent, rising incomes if the cleanup 
occurs in poor neighborhoods.  More complicated models are likely to be even less definitive.  
For example, in reality, households do differ in their tastes for different public goods.  Some 
dislike brownfields more than others, others fear crime more, others value good schools more.  
Intuitively, cleaning up and reusing brownfields and other LULUs would then make the 
neighborhood more attractive to those who most disliked them and who are most attracted to 
the new use.  Of course, just who these demographic groups are is an empirical question.  
Second, as we discuss below in Section V, models in which groups have preferences for the 
endogenous makeup of the neighborhood (i.e., where people prefer to live with other people 
                                                 
10 If Community 2 were improved, so it becomes even more desirable than before, all the opposite effects would 
occur.  Both communities would get richer on average. 
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like themselves) can lead to some surprising outcomes through the indirect effects of these 
preferences. 
Before turning to those more complicated issues, however, we first review empirical 
studies of the basic issues, in particular studies connecting changes in land uses to one of two 
of the hallmarks of gentrification:  increases in real estate prices and changes in demographic 
composition.  We then turn to studies that look at more than one hallmark, including the 
indirect effects on other public goods, aesthetics, and feedbacks through group preferences.   
IV.  Empirical Evidence of Gentrification:  Direct Effects 
As described in Section II and in the model of Section III, gentrification is a multifaceted 
phenomenon featuring housing price increases, demographic changes, and other aspects.  
Very few empirical papers have looked at even two of these faces simultaneously, still fewer 
more of them.  However, in many cases one aspect or another has been separately studied in a 
distinct literature, often without a self-conscious connection to gentrification.  To see how 
these literatures connect to the larger whole, consider the illustration in Figure 3.  This figure 
shows a pyramid, with each of its four points representing one salient feature of 
environmental gentrification.  At the top is the urban environment itself, which can be 
improved by cleaning up a LULU and converting it to a healthier and more aesthetic use 
(public open space, for example).  This improvement would be the starting point in the 
process of environmental gentrification.  Directly underneath this point is a second point 
representing the demographic composition of the neighborhood.  During gentrification, the 
neighborhood might become wealthier, more white, more educated, or younger.  To the right 
is a third point representing real estate prices.  As the community becomes more desirable 
first because of the cleaning up of the LULU, and perhaps later because of other indirect 
effects, rental prices and real estate prices would increase, another component of 
gentrification.  Finally, and most speculatively, to the left is a fourth point representing other, 
endogenous urban amenities and public goods.  These may include the aesthetics of the 
gentrified housing, public safety, local school quality, and the sets of private goods offered in 
the neighborhood.  These are additional changes in public and private goods responding to the 
cleanup of the LULU.   
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Each line segment in the pyramid represents a correlation between two of these 
aspects.  When accompanied by a theory of a causal direction between the two, they become 
theories tested in various literatures.  The arrows drawn in the figure represent some of the 
most important cases.  The hedonic literature connects both environmental and other 
amenities to real estate prices, viewing the amenities as influencing prices.  The 
environmental justice literature connects demographics to environmental quality, viewing the 
demographics as a potential determinant of pollution.  Some economic critiques of this 
literature, on the other hand, would point to an indirect effect of environmental quality on 
housing prices and housing prices on demographics.  This latter line segment, between 
housing prices and demographics might be described simply as differing housing demand 
elasticities held by differing groups.  The connection between demographics and other 
amenities includes those cases where the new populations change the aesthetic character of 
the housing stock, are associated with lower crime rates, bring a new peer group to the public 
schools, or attract new retail (the "Starbucks effect").  Last, and most speculatively, LULUs 
might have some direct connection to amenities such as crime if there is a "broken windows" 
effect, wherein the decay represented by a brownfield engenders social disconnectedness and 
disregard (e.g., Kelling and Coles 1996).   
Again, although environmental gentrification is a complex process involving the 
interaction of all these factors, insights can still be obtained from the literature exploring some 
of these links independently.  In particular, there is a fairly large literature documenting the 
consequences of land uses on both housing prices and demographics, probably the two most 
important aspects of gentrification.  As price increases and demographic changes are each two 
key features of gentrification, evidence of these effects taken separately is a necessary, though 
not sufficient, condition for the presence of gentrification. 
The ideal empirical evidence of these partial connections would be observed effects on 
each following randomized cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  Such randomized treatments being 
rare or nonexistent in social science, however, the next-best evidence comes from 
comparisons of changes before and after cleanup and reuse (or before and after the 
announcement of cleanup) with changes over a similar time frame with a control group.  A 
third tier of evidence comes from simpler cross-section regressions comparing areas with and 
without brownfields.  Although these regressions do not document the effects of land use 
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changes per se, they do provide important evidence about the likely effects of reuse.  Cleanup 
and reuse of a LULU changes an area so that it looks like other areas that have never had a 
brownfield.  However, there may still be the memory or stigma of the old LULU to hold back 
gentrification.  In addition, as we discuss below, the existing demographic makeup and 
aesthetic feel of the community may be self-reinforcing, acting as a force for stability.  Thus, 
the largest possible gentrification effects of cleanup would be to elevate prices and incomes to 
the level of control communities.  Consequently, if cross-sectional regressions show no 
substantial difference between neighborhoods with LULUs and control communities, we 
would have no reason to expect changes after cleanup.11  In this way, even cross section 
regressions provide important empirical tests of gentrification. 
We review studies that fall under each of these three categories in the remainder of 
this section, looking first at evidence of effects on land prices and second at effects on income 
and other demographic variables.  We briefly consider other amenities as well. 
Land Prices 
There is a large literature regressing real estate prices on the proximity of LULUs, or 
changes in the status of LULUs (Boyle and Kiel 2001, EPA 2006, E2 Inc. 2005, Farber 1998, 
Kiel and Williams 2007).  Typically, this "hedonic" literature is used in policy analyses to 
evaluate the benefits of cleanup and reuse.  Such an application to benefits requires additional 
assumptions about the structure of markets and household behavior, so that the difference in 
prices with or without LULUs, ceteris paribus, equals the willingness to pay to be without a 
nearby LULU.  This "benefits" interpretation is not required for our present purpose, 
however, which is only to show the effect on prices.   
As past literature reviews of these studies have concluded, the clear consensus in the 
literature is that, looking cross-sectionally, LULUs are associated with lower housing prices 
(Boyle and Kiel 2001, EPA 2006, E2 Inc. 2005, Farber 1998).  More recently, Kiel and 
Williams (2007) have looked at 57 Superfund sites and found what they interpret as evidence 
of heterogeneity in effects.  Of the 57 sites, 18 had significantly lower prices nearby, 32 had 
insignificant effects, and 7 had significantly higher prices.  In a meta-analysis, they found that 
                                                 
11 The reuse of the land could elevate prices higher if it involves an especially attractive use, one making the 
community even more attractive than the comparison communities.   
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bigger sites and sites with more data (and where estimates are more precise) were more likely 
to have statistically negative impacts, as one might expect.  We thus view these findings as 
consistent with the conventional wisdom.12   
The existence of cross-sectional differences, while consistent with such an outcome, 
does not necessarily imply that gentrification would follow from cleanup.  Thus, signs of 
changes following discovery and, especially, cleanup are especially relevant.  The largest 
literature in this area is applied to Superfund and other hazardous waste sites.13  In one of the 
first such studies, Kohlhase (1991) finds that, in Houston, land prices were no lower nearer 
Superfund sites until after sites were listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) (1986, as 
compared to 1980 and 1976).  One site was cleaned up by 1986, and it does not show the 
same relationship, suggesting cleanup can raise housing prices.  In a similar study of 
hazardous waste sites in Boston, Michaels and Smith (1990) find a positive effect of distance 
on prices, but again that it is only significant after discovery and publication.  Interestingly, 
they find these effects in all but the lowest tiered market, as defined by local real estate 
agents. 
In a study designed to further explore these information effects, Gayer, Hamilton, and 
Viscusi (2000) look at properties surrounding seven Superfund sites in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan.  They find that housing prices increase about 1 percent for every mile in distance 
from the closest Superfund site.  They find, however, that these effects decline after the US 
EPA released information on objective health risks, illustrating that the markets react to 
changes in perceptions (see also Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2002).  This suggests that they 
might react to objective changes from cleanup and reuse as well. 
Two sets of researchers have studied housing prices around the RSR lead smelter in 
Dallas.  After many years of operation, the plant closed in 1984.  During cleanup, lead was 
abated from the soil at homes within a half-mile of the facility.  A court ruled in 1986 that 
                                                 
12 Moreover, Cameron (2006) has recently demonstrated that the failure of studies to date to account for 
directional effects (stronger effects downwind, for example) can bias results downward.   
13 Others have looked at sites that might be viewed as sources of air pollutants or themselves adverse land uses.  
Kiel and McClain (1995) look at the effect of the siting of an incinerator in North Andover, MA.  They find that 
housing appreciation slowed in North Andover during construction of the incinerator and during operation, 
compared to the Boston metro area.  However, they do not find that it had a systematic relationship with distance 
to the facility.  Bui and Mayer (2003) and Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari (2006) find conflicting evidence of the 
effect of information disclosure about polluting facilities (the TRI program) on nearby property values. 
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cleanup was complete, but new concerns later arose and the site was finally placed on the 
Superfund NPL in 1993.  A second round of cleanup was completed in 2002.   
In the first study of this site, Dale et al. (1999) find that during operation and through 
the initial cleanup, housing prices were significantly lower near the smelter, by about 2% per 
mile.  This trend reversed itself in the period following the first cleanup, becoming higher 
near the smelter by 4 to 5% per mile, suggesting cleanup of such sites can reverse previous 
depressing effects on housing prices.  McCluskey and Rausser (2003a) further explored 
subtleties in the relevant area around the site and extend their work into the period of new 
concerns.  Using linear splines (a flexible functional form), they find a significant price 
gradient up to 1.2 miles, and find that this gradient is lowest in the 1979-80 period before 
initial identification and in the 1987-90 period following the first clean up.  The gradient is 
highest in the 1981-86 period of initial concern and the 1991-5 period of subsequent concern.  
This is precisely what one would expect, and again suggests that housing prices can rebound 
and increase following cleanups.  But in an extension of this work, McCluskey and Rausser 
(2003b) find that housing appreciation rates continue to lag nearest the facility.   
In an earlier study of three Superfund Sites in Woburn, Massachusetts, Kiel (1995) 
also finds that housing prices increase with distance from the nearest sites, finding a 
somewhat higher gradient of 2 to 5 percent.  Unlike the studies reviewed above, however, she 
does not find an obvious pattern in these effects from pre-discovery, through several phases 
from discovery to cleanup.  Messer et al. (2006) have also recently cast doubt on the 
hypothesis that housing prices rebound after cleanup.  They study neighborhoods around 
Superfund sites in Montery Park, CA, northern New Jersey, and Woburn.  At least in these 
three cases, where cleanup at the sites was delayed for 10 to even 20 years, property prices do 
not seem to rebound relative to more distant controls.  Messer et al. suggest this may be 
because, during the period of delay, the sites became increasingly stigmatized and that this 
stigma was not reversed by cleanup and its related activities. 
Ihlanfeldt and Taylor (2004), meanwhile, have found somewhat mixed evidence of the 
effects of cleanup.  Instead of looking at residential property, they explored the effects of 
hazardous waste sites on five classes of commercial and industrial property in Atlanta:  
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apartment, office, retail, industrial, and vacant.14  They find that price gradients with distance 
increased after discovery and listing of a hazardous waste site.  After listing, they find that 
prices continue to rise to a distance of at least 2 miles, and are generally 10-25 percent higher 
at that distance than at 0.5 miles, and as much as 36 percent higher for office space but only 
3 percent higher for industrial sites.  However, looking at sites that were subsequently 
delisted, they find no statistically significant effect of this delisting.  Moreover, surprisingly, 
these sites did not show the same systematic effect at the time of discovery and listing as the 
other sites. 
Throughout this literature, distance and time effects are crucial.  In a study of property 
values surrounding a former copper smelter in Tacoma, WA, McMillen and Thorsnes (2003) 
refine the treatment of these dimensions by modeling them non-parametrically.  In particular, 
they estimate a smooth but otherwise arbitrarily varying derivative of price with respect to 
distance from the smelter.  Moreover, they allow this derivative to vary with time, which runs 
from 1977 to 1998.  On average, they find that there is a positive effect of distance on price in 
the early years, but an effect that is steadily declining in time.  At about 1986 or 1987, after 
the smelter was closed, the effect reverses itself and distance to the smelter—correlated with 
distance to the city center and to the bay—is given a premium.  This effect occurs well before 
cleanup began in 1995.   
These conflicting results raise several questions about conventional hedonic 
techniques.  For example, are areas further from adverse land uses systematically different in 
terms of other factors that cannot be observed or controlled in multivariate regression?  Are 
sites that are cleaned up relatively quickly (as in the Ihlanfeldt and Taylor study) smaller or 
less dirty than other sites?  And likewise, are sites that take many years to clean up (as in 
Messer et al.) systematically worse? 
To address these problems, Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) employ a natural 
experimental design that allows cleanup of Superfund sites to be treated as an exogenous 
variable.  They also improve upon earlier work by employing a national sample.  This sample 
                                                 
14 Howland (2000, 2004) similarly studied industrial sites in Baltimore, looking at sales of actual brownfield 
sites.  She finds that such sites sold for 55% less per acre than clean sites, but that the contamination and 
associated regulatory uncertainty did not otherwise limit the operation of land markets.  Contaminated properties 
continued to sell, but at lower prices. 
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includes all census tracts near the 690 hazardous waste sites that were finalists for Superfund's 
National Priority List.  These sites were given a score using a Hazardous Ranking System, 
with a score of 28.5 in this system being the original cut-off for listing.  Although other sites 
were later added, the score remains a major factor in the pattern of listings.  By using the 
score as an econometric “instrument,” Greenstone and Gallagher remove the effect that land 
values may have had on listing via a political process for listing.  Moreover, by focusing only 
on sites with scores just above or just below the threshold of 28.5, sites with similar objective 
risks but with different policy treatments can be compared.   
By using these strategies, Greenstone and Gallagher provide the strongest empirical 
design to date in this literature.15  They find little evidence that NPL listing affects housing 
prices relative to other CERCLA sites that are not listed.  However, note that they studied the 
effect of listings, including any subsequent cleanup, but not the isolated effect of cleanup or 
reuse.  The effect of listing is ambiguous in theory.  On the one hand, it might have been 
expected to increase prices, as cleanup follows listing.  On the other, it might be expected to 
lower prices, as it is an informational signal to households about risks and may perhaps create 
a permanent stigma.  To help distinguish these effects, Greenstone and Gallagher also analyze 
housing rents, with differential effects for listing and for actual cleanup.  Again, there is little 
consistent effect. 
Taken as a whole, this literature yield conflicting findings for a property value effect 
following cleanup.  As a final comment, we note that most of these studies, and our discussion 
of them to this point, have essentially been framed in terms of the presence or absence of a 
LULU.  However, the reuse of a cleaned up LULU, that is, the land use that replaces it, may 
be just as important an issue.  For example, one-third of reused Superfund sites have been 
converted to green spaces (Vitulli et al. 2004), as have many brownfields (IEDC 2001, De 
Sousa 2003).  Hedonic studies have generally confirmed that such land uses increase nearby 
property values (see McConnell and Walls 2005 for a recent review, and Irwin and Bockstael 
2001 and Irwin 2002 for excellent examples.)  Areas where land reuse involves conversion to 
amenities like parks or other open spaces, then, might be especially prone to gentrification.  
                                                 
15 Although one limitation is that they are constrained to analyze data at the census tract level.  It should also be 
noted that a crucial assumption in their design is that non-NPL sites are not cleaned up under other, state 
programs.  If they were, the comparison would be merely between sites cleaned up under one program vs. sites 
cleaned up another program.   
 20
On the other hand, if the land is used for residential developments, the increase supply of 
housing may actually lower housing prices.  While this possibility should be kept in mind, 
most studies appear to support the idea that cleanup increases property values. 
Demographics 
Just as a large literature has analyzed the direct connection between LULUs and real 
estate values, a separate (and for the most part quite distinct) literature has focused on the 
direct connection between LULUs and local demographics.  In particular, the so-called 
"environmental justice" literature has explored correlations in the presence of LULUs and 
poor or minority populations.  See Pastor (2002), Ringquist (2003), Bowen (2002), and 
Noonan (2005) for recent reviews and Ringquist (2005) for a meta-analysis.16   
Most of this literature has addressed the question of whether there is racism or other 
injustice in the siting of hazardous facilities.  However, just as we were not primarily 
concerned with the benefits interpretation of hedonics, but merely the correlation and the 
causal connections, so too here our concern is merely with evidence for or against 
demographic gentrification—changing populations that are richer and perhaps more white—
following cleanup and reuse of a site.  
Since early work by the United Church of Christ (1987), most researchers have found 
that LULUs are located in poor and minority neighborhoods.17  In a recent meta-analysis, 
Ringquist (2005) finds the location of noxious facilities and/or Superfund sites had a 
statistically significant relationship with minority populations across 33 studies, even 
controlling for various levels of geographic aggregation and measures of study quality.18  A 
weak correlation is present for income and poverty, but it is not very robust to study details.  
A number of individual studies have found an inverted u-shape, with LULUs present near 
                                                 
16 Engel (1997-98) discusses the potential conflict between the goals of the environmental justice movement and 
the movement to reuse brownfields.  In conflict with the former, the latter often involves easing cleanup 
requirements.  See also The Environmental Law Institute (2002). 
17 Anderton et al. (1994) is one exception. 
18 Although they are more numerous, less work has explored such correlation for brownfields.  The Council for 
Urban Economic Development (1999) found that a sample of 107 brownfield projects had higher concentrations 
of minority populations and poverty levels within a 1-mile radius than statewide averages.  However, this may 
simply be because they are in more urban areas than the rest of the state.  Heberle and Wernstedt (2005) found in 
a sample of nearly 50 developers that their brownfield projects were in census tracts where the median income 
was 25 percent less than the median income of the wider metropolitan area. 
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low-middle class neighborhoods, so the interpretation of Ringuist's results is less clear in this 
case. 
There are two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses explaining these correlations.  One 
possibility, stressed by environmental justice activists, is that firms and local governments are 
discriminatory in their siting practices.  An alternative possibility is that the siting, or perhaps 
later revelations of hazards at the site, triggers neighborhood decay.  Under this scenario, 
demand for land in the neighborhood declines, richer households leave, and poorer (perhaps 
minority) households attracted to lower housing costs move in.19  Essentially, this process 
following siting is the reverse of the gentrification story following cleanup.   
Several papers have tested these dynamics in various settings, with conflicting 
findings.  Been (1994, 1997) was the first to articulate such a reverse gentrification story in 
the environmental justice literature.  In her most extensive empirical analysis, Been (1997) 
studies a national sample of census tracts with Toxic Storage and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs) 
compared to a control group of all other tracts.  She finds that, in 1990, Black and Hispanic 
populations are correlated with the presence of a TSDF.  When she looks at the demographics 
of those tracts at the time the TSDF was sited, she continues to find some evidence of a 
correlation, especially for Hispanics.  The probability of hosting a TSDF is also an inverted-U 
shape function of income.  Moreover, when she looks at changes in demographics between 
1970 and 1990 at those tracts that hosted new TSDFs in the 1970s, she finds that their share of 
minorities grew less than control tracts.  Thus, despite having introduced it, Been's findings 
suggest that gentrification processes have not been important in shaping existing correlations 
between demographics and TSDFs. 
Pastor et al. (2001) similarly study TSDFs in Los Angeles.  They give greater attention 
to issues associated with the scale of impacts than did Been, looking at all tracts within ¼ mile 
or 1 mile of a TSDF.  They also look only at tracts without a TSDF as of 1970.  They find that 
the probability of a tract having a facility located within these distances between 1970 and 
1990 is a positive and significant function of 1970 minorities.  Again, it is also an inverted-U 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of this process, see Been (1994, 1997), Baden and Coursey (2002), Bowen (2002), and 
Banzhaf and Walsh (2006). 
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shaped function of income.  Like Been, Pastor et al. also find that 1980-90 changes in 
minority populations is not a function of TSDF sitings in the 1970s. 
Those two papers thus find no evidence of reverse-gentrification following siting of a 
LULU.  Other papers have found more evidence of reverse gentrification.  Baden and 
Coursey (2002) studied environmental hazards (CERCLA and large RCRA sites) in Chicago.  
They found that although these LULUs were correlated with Hispanic populations in 1990, 
there was no correlation with minority groups as of 1960, presumably before they were 
understood as hazards.  This pattern holds up under a variety of specifications and hazard 
types. 
Wolverton (2002) improves upon the econometrics of these papers by explicitly 
modeling firm decisions using a conditional logit model.  Specifically, she models the siting 
of polluting plants listed in the Toxic Release Inventory in Texas as a function of land prices, 
local wage rates, the existence of other facilities, and local demographics.  Like Baden and 
Coursey (2002), she does not find evidence that minority populations contributed to firm 
location decisions, although like Been (1997) and Pastor et al. (2001) she finds evidence for 
the inverted-U shape with respect to income. 
Thus, studies thus provide conflicting evidence about the historical pattern after siting.  
Recently, Cameron and Crawford (2004) and Cameron and McConnaha (2006) have 
conducted careful and focused evaluations of a small number of case studies, over periods 
which include the cleanup of some sites.  Cameron and McConnaha look at four Superfund 
sites: the Old Bethpage Landfill on Long Island, Tacoma's copper smelter, the RSR lead 
smelter in Dallas, and Love Canal.  Cameron and Crawford (2004) study seven Superfund 
sites.   
Both studies report the evolution, from 1970 to 2000, of a number of socioeconomic, 
demographic, and mobility indicators around these sites as a function of distance to the site.  
They find heterogeneous patterns.  In some cases, the share of whites decreased closer to the 
sites, in other cases it increased.  Interestingly, given the role of childless households in some 
of the gentrification literature, they also consider a variety of household structures, although, 
again, consistent patterns do not emerge.  They also find no clear patterns in mobility (as 
proxied by the number share of people in the same house as five years ago).  They do find, 
 23
however, that the percent of households above the regional median income either declined or 
was statistically insignificant over the three decades.  They also find some evidence of 
rebound effects in some indicators.  In particular, Cameron and McConnaha (2006) note that 
the Bethpage landfill, which was listed early and which was cleaned up in 1993 (though not 
de-listed) had the strongest signal of a rebound.  Households with income above the regional 
median, for example, increased in the 1990 to 2000 period nearer to the site, after declining 
from 1970 to 1980.  The fact that the strongest evidence for this aspect of gentrification 
occurred near this site, where there was the most time post-cleanup, suggests that 
gentrification may occur with some lag, and that it may still occur at the other sites. 
Banzhaf and Walsh (2006) have focused on gentrification-type responses to the entry 
and exit of polluting facilities in California, as recorded in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).  
Although these facilities are active polluters, they point out that households may be reacting 
more to a locally undesirable land use than to local air quality.  They find strong evidence for 
decreasing population density from 1990 to 2000 near both old and new (post-1990) facilities, 
and increasing density following closure.  They also find weak evidence of decreasing 
incomes near both older and new facilities.  They find that both affects occur at one-half mile 
from the TRI sites, but at a weaker level than one-quarter mile.  Greenstone and Gallagher 
(2005), discussed above in the context of property values, find similar results in looking at 
demographic responses to Superfund cleanups.  In particular, they find that in 2000, tracts 
near cleaned up NPL sites had increasing population density over 1980, relative to other 
hazardous waste sites.  They find some weak evidence of increasing incomes after cleanup, 
but no meaningful evidence of other demographic effects. 
In summary, the evidence of demographic effects associated with gentrification is 
roughly consistent with the theoretical model described above.  There is preliminary evidence 
of an increase in the number of households and the population density of a cleaned up 
neighborhood.  Such a revitalization represents an increase in the demand for real estate, and 
in this sense is connected to the hedonic literature reviewed above.  There is also some weak 
evidence of an increase in the share of wealthier and non-minority households in Banzhaf and 
Walsh (2006), Greenstone and Gallagher (2005), and perhaps in Cameron and McConnaha 
(2006) (at the Bethpage landfill).  Studies have not found consistent racial, family, or other 
group effects. 
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Crime and other amenities 
As noted in the earlier discussion, decreasing crime and increasing changes in the set 
of urban amenities, including the type of public spaces, the type of retail (the "Starbucks 
effect") or the feel of the community ("aesthetic promiscuity"), are all hallmarks of 
gentrification.  O'Sullivan (2005) found that in Portland, changes in crime, housing prices, 
and the income and educational attainment of the population moved together.  
Most of these types of effects of cleanup, if present at all, are likely to be the indirect 
result of changes in demographics (lines 2 and 5 in Figure 3).  Reuse, while also having these 
indirect effects, might be more likely to directly affect some other amenities, but this would 
be highly case specific.  As a rule, then, we do not expect to see many direct effects on other 
amenities.  The one reasonable exception is crime.  As brownfields and other LULUs are 
located in high-crime areas, crime reduction is often cited as one goal of cleanup and reuse.   
One plausible mechanism for cleanup of LULUs to reduce crime is the “broken 
windows” effect (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Kelling and Coles 1996).  The broken windows 
theory is that small changes in the physical environment, such as fixing broken windows and 
removing graffiti, can reduce the rates of more serious violent and property crimes.  Cleaning 
up pollution, removing abandoned buildings, and so forth may fit into this category.  An 
intriguing potential second mechanism has been suggested by Kuo and Sullivan (2001).  They 
point to psychological evidence that brain activity differs when people are in green spaces, in 
a way that is more restful and reduces stress.  They hypothesize that this psychological effect, 
as well as the congregation of people around green spaces, may reduce crime.  In support of 
this theory, they find that crime rates are lower in greener sections of a major Chicago public 
housing development, even though residents were randomly assigned to apartments.  If 
brownfields and other LULUs have the opposite effect, cleaning them up may reduce crime 
rates.  If the land is reused as a park or other green space, the effect would be more direct.   
These effects remain speculative.  Apart from a small number of qualitative case 
studies,20 we have not found any documentation of improved crime rates following cleanup 
and reuse of LULUs. 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/bridgeport_wentfield.pdf. 
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V.  General Equilibrium Effects 
So far, we have discussed direct connections between land uses and the character of nearby 
communities, with an emphasis on land prices and demographics.  Although these are 
probably the two most important features, various perspectives on gentrification all describe a 
cascade of effects that interact, perhaps reinforcing, perhaps dampening, these direct effects.  
As a starting point, changes in land prices and changes in demographics occur simultaneously.  
If different groups have differing demands for land, then changes in land prices will further 
influence demographic composition.  At the same time, if people have preferences for the 
demographic composition of their neighborhood, demographic changes can affect the demand 
for land and hence prices.   
In addition, these changes may bring about other changes in the character of the 
neighborhood.  Wealthier households may replace or rejuvenate the housing stock, further 
affecting housing prices.  New residents may vote for, or organize to create, different levels of 
public goods (or just different kinds of public goods).  They may be associated with lower 
crime rates.  They may also bring differing levels of educational attainment to the school 
system and otherwise alter the nature of the student peer group.  They may have differing 
tastes for private goods, and so new retail may move in to cater to those tastes (the 
“Starbucks” effect).  And so on. 
Recently a family of new "equilibrium sorting models" has emerged in the economics 
literature, which model some of these simultaneous effects through economic structures 
(preferences, public good "production functions," and so on).  Very few of these models 
address environmental issues at all, let alone cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  Nevertheless, we 
can gain insights on the importance of these indirect effects for gentrification processes, even 
if changes in local land uses is not the precipitating factor in the studies. 
In the first application of this literature to an environmental issue, Sieg et al. (2004) 
and Smith et al. (2004) study the simultaneous effects of changing populations and changing 
land prices in response to changes in air quality in Los Angeles.  They estimate an empirical 
version of the model introduced in Section III, in which households differ by income and 
tastes for public goods.  They find that in general equilibrium, although average ozone 
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improved by 6 to 20 percent across the 5 counties, the equilibrating change in average prices 
was -6% to 20%.   
For our purposes, one of the most important take-home messages from these papers is 
that local residents can be made worse off after an improvement in neighborhood amenities, 
even though they have some value for it.  Because of below-average tastes for public goods 
and/or below average incomes, the households who live in an initially dirty community have 
lower (though still positive) willingness-to-pay for the amenity.21  When the community is 
cleaned up and amenities improve, other, outside residents compete to live there, bidding up 
the price of land to their own, higher willingness to pay for the amenities.  Poorer residents 
are forced to pay these higher rents, or move.  Even if they move elsewhere, they are not 
likely to find as good an alternative as their original community, which they had chosen over 
other alternatives.  Moreover, in reality they would have to pay both the out-of-pocket and the 
psychological costs of moving, an issue overlooked in the model.  However, note that housing 
prices did fall in some communities where air quality improved, though by less than other 
areas.  These residents are likely to be made better off, as housing prices fall and public goods 
improve.   
In an application closer to the cleanup and reuse issues addressed in this paper, Walsh 
(2004) uses the same basic model to study the provision of new open space in Raleigh, NC.  
In his model, households have preferences for fixed green spaces like parks, but also for the 
population density, which serves as a proxy for “greenness” insofar as larger lots help 
maintain a more open and rural character.  When new open space is provided in a 
neighborhood, increased demand for living in the neighborhood drives up population density 
and with it new construction, decreasing that aspect of open space and thus counter-acting 
some of the effects of the original policy.  Again, Walsh finds that local residents can be made 
worse off after the provision of green space in their community.  Even though they have some 
value for green spaces, their value is not as high as others, who, with a relative high 
willingness to pay for the amenity, bid up rents high enough to offset the direct gain of the 
green spaces to the initial residents. 
                                                 
21 In the Tiebout logic of the model, this is revealed by their choice to live in that community in the first place.  
Relatively speaking, they weight the advantages of affordable housing over those amenities. 
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Although these papers offer important insights into the distributional effects of public 
good improvements, two limitations suggest reason for caution before applying their 
empirical findings too literally.  First, mobility is costless in the models, and households have 
no tastes for home and no connection to a specific job location.  In short, they have no 
connection to "place" beyond its description by a vector of public goods and prices.  As a 
result, the models predict an unrealistic level of turnover from changes in public goods.22  
This high turnover, in turn, allows prices to change more than they otherwise might in some 
communities.  On the other hand, as noted above, abstracting from moving costs also implies 
that the negative welfare impacts on those initial residents who do move are understated (see 
Vigdor 2006 for discussion). 
Second, all households are renters in the model, with increases in rents being captured 
by absentee landlords outside the model.  Homeownership will have different implications for 
the general equilibrium welfare effects, with homeowners reaping the capital gain in their 
house rather than paying out higher rents.  However, allowing for homeownership probably 
would only increase the inequity of the welfare impacts.  On average, poorer households 
would be the renters in a neighborhood experiencing cleanup and reuse of a LULU, so it is the 
poorer households who would pay out the higher rents, while (on average) richer homeowners 
would capture the gains in their property assets.23   
A second strand of this equilibrium sorting literature accounts for households’ 
preferences for racial homogeneity or diversity and more generally socioeconomic 
composition of communities, which naturally develop endogenously.  In a recent theoretical 
paper, Sidon (2005) explores conditions under which two neighborhoods, one clean and one 
dirty, are segregated by race or income.  Generally speaking, Sidon finds that when 
environmental preferences are strong and racial preferences are weak, the communities will 
be segregated by income, with richer households outbidding poorer households for the clean 
                                                 
22 For example, Sieg et al. (2004) find in their policy simulation a 97% turnover in one community following a 
9% improvement in ozone concentrations.  Seventy-five percent of the new residents came from two 
communities that were close substitutes.   
23 Of course, along with their higher housing values homeowners would also face higher tax assessments.  If new 
residents have a higher demand for public goods, they might also raise tax rates (e.g. Epple et al. 2001).  
However, homeowners should still be better off, unless they are highly immobile (so they cannot cash out and 
move) and liquidity constrained (so they cannot tap into higher values to pay current taxes with, e.g., a reverse 
mortgage). 
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community.  Wealthier minorities will join wealthy whites in the clean community.  As racial 
tastes increase in intensity, segregation is more likely to occur along racial lines, with the 
wealthy minorities now joining their poorer peers in the dirty community.  As those tastes 
strengthen even further, it is even possible to support an equilibrium in which the minorities 
are in the clean community and whites in the dirty community.   
Sidon's model is particularly relevant to this review because he analyzes the effect of 
cleaning up the dirty community, such as by decontamination and reuse of a LULU.  The 
effect of this shift is similar to the effect of lowering the relative weight on environmental 
preferences.  Income sorting becomes less likely, because rich minorities, previously attracted 
to the clean community (or repelled by the dirty community), need no longer sacrifice 
environmental quality in order to join their peers.  Racial sorting then becomes more likely.  
Since the dirty community had an initially higher level of minorities in the model, as observed 
empirically for communities near LULUs, we would consequently predict clean up and reuse 
to increase the proportion of minorities in the neighborhood.24   
In recent empirical work, Bayer and McMillan (2005) have confirmed Sidon's 
intuition.  Using a sorting model of locational choice in San Francisco, they estimate 
households' preferences for the racial, income, and educational composition of a community, 
preferences that individually vary by those same socioeconomic factors.  They then simulate a 
counterfactual in which such sociodemographic tastes are not present.  Although they do not 
look at land uses or other environmental amenities, they find that the black-white gap in other 
public goods such as school quality and crime falls by about one-half.   
Others have argued that school quality and crime are themselves endogenous functions 
of local sociodemographics (e.g. O’Sullivan 2005).  Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003) 
allow for this possibility in additional simulations using a similar model.  Again, they do not 
look at environmental amenities, but they do consider an exogenous change in a local public 
good, namely school quality.  When racial preferences are ignored, the average school zone 
experiences a $1,000 increase in mean income when its test score is increased by one standard 
deviation.  When racial preferences are accounted for, income increases $1,600.  And when 
                                                 
24 Note that this reinforces the message from Banzhaf and Walsh (2006), presented in Section III, where 
increasing incomes was predicted more strongly than changes in racial composition.  It is also consistent with 
their empirical findings as well as those of Greenstone and Gallagher (2005).   
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further endogenous increases in school quality are allowed to follow from the new peer group 
in the school, and when crime rates are similarly allowed to fall, the effect rises to $1,800.   
In the simulation of Bayer et al., the presence of racial preferences accelerated the 
gentrification process.  However, this need not necessarily be the case.  The most fundamental 
insight of these models and simulations is that the introduction of racial and other group-
preferences creates the possibility for a “tipping point,” above which gentrification may be 
accelerated but below which it may be slowed (Schelling 1969, 1972).  That is, one important 
implication of these models and simulations is that, when multiple equilibria are possible, 
cleanup of a LULU may not automatically transition a community to look like communities 
that never had one.  In some cases, demographic preferences may be a force keeping the 
previous demographic composition relatively stable.  Absent any history of a LULU, a 
neighborhood may be just as likely to be predominantly white as it is to be predominantly 
minority.  With the introduction of a LULU, it is more likely to become a predominantly 
minority community.  With the removal of LULU, either outcome is supportable in theory as 
an economic equilibrium.  However, the existing equilibrium of predominant minority 
makeup is an obvious focal point and so may remain stable and even become more dominated 
by the minority group.  If they are directly or indirectly related to any of these demographic 
effects, housing prices would be expected to reflect them concomitantly.   
Cameron and McConnaha (2006) make this precise point when they note that 
Studies that have failed to find that housing prices rebound to pre-
contamination levels may be assuming, implicitly, that sociodemographic 
characteristics of the affected neighborhoods were unaffected by events 
surrounding the discovery and remediation of an environmental hazard.  If 
households were immobile, if the environmental risk was transitory, and if 
there was no permanent taint associated with a Superfund site, then restoration 
of prior housing prices might be expected.  However, if the character of the 
neighborhood is fundamentally changed by these events, and reverse migration 
is asymmetric compared to out-migration, we might see prolonged effects upon 
housing prices.  (p. 286) 
Thus, the importance of other aesthetic amenities and public goods created by neighborhoods 
may make them somewhat more resilient to gentrification.  This may be one reason why 
before-and-after comparisons of cleanup of LULUs have found weaker demographic 
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responses than cross-sectional comparisons, and that Cameron and McConnaha (2006) found 
the strongest evidence in the case where there was the most time for a response. 
We conclude this section on general equilibrium effects with a paper that takes a very 
different modeling approach, but that applies it to a policy question of direct relevance to this 
review.  Noonan et al. (2006) model the change in local housing prices following the cleanup 
of Superfund sites, allowing for endogenous changes in the housing stock and in local 
demographics.  They look at changes in mean housing values as reported in the 1990 to 2000 
census years in a national sample of census block-groups, with the variable of interest being 
an indicator variable for the presence of a Superfund site that has been deleted from the 
National Priority List, either in the block-group or an adjacent block-group.   
Changes in housing prices are also a function of changes in endogenous housing 
quality (e.g. age, number of rooms, utilities, density) and neighborhood demographics (e.g. 
income, percent white, percent college graduates, percent poor, and percent blue collar 
workers.)  These in turn are modeled as functions of changes in one another and housing 
prices, as well as the deletion from the NPL.  Noonan et al. take a traditional reduced-form 
simultaneous equations approach, with lagged levels and changes of each of these factors 
serving as instruments.   
In their preliminary results, Noonan et al. find little evidence for a direct effect of 
housing appreciation following cleanup, except for with the most restrictive models.  They do 
find evidence for upgrade in the housing stock, with younger and bigger houses appearing 
after cleanup.  They do not find demographic effects.  Taking the joint effects of all the 
relevant interactions, Noonan et al. find slightly positive effects (on the order of 1% to 5%) on 
housing values (pure price effects and quality upgrades).25  Taken as a whole, there is thus 
some suggestive evidence of gentrification, but as with the other empirical work not 
definitive. 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
Unfortunately, there are really no rigorous empirical studies that have looked at the full 
picture of gentrification in the context of the appearance, cleanup, or reuse of LULUs.  In this 
                                                 
25 As of the time of this writing standard errors are not available for this estimate. 
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paper, we have tried to gain insights into the issue by looking at theoretical models and 
empirical studies that have looked at at least one aspect of gentrification at a time, plus others 
that have looked at multiple aspects in settings that are similar to the cleanup of LULUs.  In 
this final section we summarize our findings from the literature by responding to a series of 
questions about environmental gentrification.   
What are the characteristics of gentrification? 
There are three principle hallmarks of gentrification in virtually every perspective on 
the subject: rising property values and rental costs; new construction or renovation upgrading 
the housing stock; and a turnover in the local population bringing in residents with a higher 
socioeconomic status.  Various perspectives emphasize other features as well, but most 
involve some sense of the creation of a new amenity, based on architecture, retail, lifestyle, or 
just common peer groups.  These new endogenous amenities further drive gentrification. 
Do cleanup of LULUs and/or reuse trigger gentrification? 
The literature yields conflicting signals on whether cleanup is likely to trigger 
gentrification.  A simple Tiebout model predicts price effects following an increase in demand 
for living in the neighborhood.  It also predicts richer households under restrictive 
circumstances, but has no predictions for other demographic groups, even those differing by 
mean income.  Introducing group preferences can lead to counterintuitive effects, where 
populations of minorities or other groups with lower average incomes can increase following 
cleanup.  If housing prices are also a function of these demographics, one would expect 
attendant indirect effects on real estate values as well. 
Consistent with these surprisingly vague theoretical predictions, the empirical 
literature has found only weak or conflicting evidence of gentrification.  First consider land 
prices.  Cross-sectional work has consistently found lower housing values near a variety of 
LULUs.  In addition, early work found lower housing prices near Superfund sites after 
discovery, and rebounding prices following cleanup.  But more recently, Messer et al. (2006) 
suggest this need not happen in every case, especially where prolonged cleanup activities 
have created a potential stigma.  Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) likewise find no effect in a 
national sample of NPL sites compared to other CERCLA sites.   
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With respect to demographics, again, cross-sectional studies consistently find poorer 
or minority households near LULUs.  Studies are conflicted as to whether these are the result 
of reverse-gentrification following siting of the LULU, with Been (1997) and Pastor et al. 
(2001) suggesting not, but Baden and Coursey (2002) and Wolverton (2002) suggesting so.  
After cleanup, the evidence is again mixed.  Banzhaf and Walsh (2006) and Greenstone and 
Gallagher (2005) both find evidence of increased density following improved land uses, weak 
evidence for increases in income, and little to no evidence for a decrease in minorities.  
Cameron and McConnaha (2006) find little effect on income, except perhaps at the first site to 
be cleaned up (in 1993), and again no effect on either racial or family composition.   
Finally, recent work by Noonan et al. (2006) looking at a set of simultaneous effects of 
Superfund cleanup finds no direct effect on prices, no consistent effect on demographics, but 
some effect on the quality of the housing stock, which increases housing values.  These joint 
effects are consistent with the partial effects found in other studies. 
We find no papers looking at the further effect of specific reuses of land following 
cleanup.  However, evidence that some converted land uses such as greenfields are associated 
with higher neighborhood land prices (Walls and McConnell 2005) is suggestive.  In addition, 
the sociological description of gentrification as a new aesthetic emphasizing recent 
construction or renovated properties and urban culture hints at another way that reuse might 
trigger gentrification.  In particular, if cleanup, and especially a particular reuse, of a LULU 
changes the aesthetic "feel" of a community, it may be more likely to trigger gentrification by 
attracting a new type of resident.  Yet this is mere speculation. 
What is the potential geographic extent of gentrification? 
If gentrification occurs, its geographic extent is likely to be very local.  Glass (1964) 
and Zukin (1987) stress that gentrified neighborhoods can exist side-by-side with 
deteriorating ones.  Most hedonic price studies of Superfund sites have focused on very local 
areas, with effects extending to 2 miles or so at most.  Studies with the most flexible 
functional forms (using rings around a LULU or splines, for example) find the strongest 
effects within about a mile (e.g. Ihlanfeldt and Taylor 2004, McCluskey and Rausser 2003).   
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With respect to demographics, Banzhaf and Walsh find that income responses to TRI 
sites are still present one-half mile away, but weaker than one-quarter mile.  The cleanup and 
reuse of smaller LULUs, such as brownfields, are likely to have even more local effects.   
To what extent do residents and businesses turn over following decontamination or reuse? 
As emphasized earlier, turnover is not necessary for pre-existing residents to be 
harmed by cleanup and reuse of LULUs.  Housing prices may still increase, and immobile 
households may simply have to pay these higher costs.  On the other hand, when they are 
mobile and have good substitutes to move to, households may escape these costs (see Banzhaf 
and Walsh 2006, Vigdor 2002, 2006).  Moreover, if baseline turnover rates are high enough, 
gentrification and demographic changes may occur even without an increase in the turnover 
rate.   
Simulation models of general equilibrium responses to changes like cleanup of a 
LULU have generally predicted quite high—indeed, unrealistic—turnover (e.g. Sieg et al. 
2004).  However, these models impose no monetary or psychological costs of moving, and 
incorporate no sense of place (a “home” or job location).  Empirical studies of mobility have 
generally found no evidence of increase in turnover following cleanup.  In particular, 
Cameron and McConnaha (2006) find no pattern to the change in the percentage of 
households at the same house as five years ago following either discovery or cleanup of four 
Superfund sites.  Somewhat removed from these landuse and environmental applications, 
Vigdor (2006) finds that renters are no more likely to move in neighborhoods experiencing 
lower rates of abandoned housing and barred windows. 
Although more work would be needed before reaching definitive conclusions, these 
two studies suggest that turnover is not likely to increase following cleanup and reuse of 
LULUs.  However, this does not imply that there is no gentrification.  The studies do not 
show a decrease in turnover either.  Even if it occurs at an ordinary, typical pace, if the 
turnover involves replacing one demographic group with another, gentrification might still 
occur.  As discussed above, there is some evidence supporting increases in income following 
cleanup, although little evidence for changes in other demographic groups.  
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What factors and policies can mitigate gentrification, and what role can they play? 
The literature suggests several factors that might minimize the probability of any 
gentrification occurring or mitigate its effects.  First, reuse projects that fit the existing 
character of the community are less likely to trigger gentrification.  That is, new housing, 
retail, or public amenities should be of a kind that is appealing to existing residents.  
Consistent with this point, the NEJAC (2006) report on unintended consequences stresses the 
importance of community involvement in planning reuse projects. 
Second, given the role of racial and other demographic preferences in maintaining an 
equilibrium, targeting more homogenous communities may be less likely to trigger 
gentrification as well.  This is because these communities are probably further from a "tipping 
point" at which they would switch over to a new demographic composition. 
Third, the work of Sieg et al. (2004) and Smith et al. (2004) suggests that when large 
policies target several communities within a metro area, gentrification effects are likely to be 
smaller.  While improving a single community is likely to increase its attractiveness relative 
to all other communities, creating incentives for other households to move in and driving up 
its housing prices, improving many communities would neutralize this effect, lifting all boats 
equally. 
Finally, we have also noted that communities with owner-occupied housing are less 
likely to suffer from the adverse effects of rising land prices, although taxes remain a concern.  
A recent report from the Urban Institute (Levy, Comey, Padilla 2006) suggests three strategies 
that can be used to help low-income residents afford housing when gentrification threatens.  
Strategies that have been observed to be successful for providing or assuring affordable 
housing include:  production of affordable units, retention of existing affordable housing 
units, and asset building for current residents and neighborhood families.  Strategies for the 
production of affordable units include creating housing trust funds, inclusionary zoning 
ordinances, and the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, in addition to split-rate tax 
structure and tax-increment financing.  In the studies completed, it was found that retention of 
the affordable housing stock can be encouraged through the enforcement of code, rent control, 
and the preservation of federally subsidized affordable housing.  Thirdly, strategies to build 
resident assets may be effective in mitigating displacement.  As used by Levy, Comey, and 
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Padilla, asset building includes individual development accounts, homeownership education 
and counseling, limited equity housing co-ops, community land trusts, location efficient 
mortgages, and the Section 8 homeownership program.  These three strategies were found to 
be effective in six case studies examined by Levy et al. (see also Kennedy and Leonard 2001).  
Given these empirical findings, and given these policy options, there seems ample 
hope for cleanup and reuse of contaminated properties that is a true Pareto improvement for 
all households—not just a "potential" improvement. 
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Appendix:  A formal model of gentrification 
As noted in the text, to gain insight into gentrification following cleanup and reuse of LULUs, 
we employ a model of vertically differentiated communities introduced by Epple, Filimon, 
and Romer (1984), a more general version of which has been estimated econometrically by 
Epple and Sieg (1999) and applied to environmental improvements by Sieg et al. (2004) and 
Walsh (2004).  Banzhaf and Walsh (2006) and Vigdor (2006) use this model to gain insights 
into environmental gentrification.  This appendix is based on Banzhaf and Walsh. 
Consider a continuum of households that are characterized by their income y and 
demographic group t.  The joint distribution of types and income is given by f(y,t).  The 
marginal distribution of income is given by fy(y) and the distribution of income conditional on 
type t is given by .  Household preferences are defined over housing with price P, a 
numeraire whose price is normalized to 1, and environmental quality G.  Household i’s 
preferences are represented by the indirect utility function 
)(yf ty
 Vi = V(yi,P,G). (1) 
Each household chooses to live in a community Jj∈ and, conditional on community 
choice, chooses a quantity of housing Di.  Each community is characterized by its supply of 
housing Sj and level of environmental quality Gj, both of which are exogenously determined.  
To facilitate a characterization of the equilibrium sorting of households across communities, 
we further assume that household preferences satisfy the "single crossing" property.  This 
condition requires that the slope of an indirect indifference curve in the (G,P) plane be 
increasing in y.26  Although household demand for public goods in this simple model is 
differentiated only by differences in income, the model can be extended to include 
heterogeneity in tastes without altering the key insights derived here. 
Given the assumption of single crossing, equilibrium can be characterized by an 
ordering of communities that is increasing in both P and G.  That is, there is a clear ordering 
of communities from low price, low quality communities to high price, high quality 
communities.  Further, for each pair of "neighboring" communities (as sorted by this ranking), 
there will exist a set of boundary households (defined by an income level) that are indifferent 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of the single crossing property in this context see Epple & Sieg (1999). 
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between the two communities. Households whose income is below the boundary income will 
prefer the lower ordered community and those whose income is above the boundary income 
will prefer the higher ordered community.  This leads to perfect income stratification of 
households across communities.27  Equilibrium prices Pj and boundary incomes 1, +jjY are 
implicitly defined by the equilibrium conditions of equation (2): 
 }1,...,1{),,(),,( 111,1, −∈∀= ++++ JjGPYVGPYV jjjjjjjj  (2) 
 , },...,1{)(),,( JjSdyyfGPyDM j
Cy
yJj
j
∈∀=∫
∈
where M is the total mass of households, D(.) is housing demand, and Cj is the set of incomes 
locating in community j.  These equations formalize the J-1 boundary indifference conditions 
and the requirement that the land markets clear in each of the J communities, yielding 2J-1 
equations to identify the 2J-1 endogenous variables. 
We use the model to consider two issues important for the analysis of migration and 
environmental gentrification.  First, we consider the implied distribution of households across 
communities for demographic groups with different income distributions, .  Second, 
we evaluate how the predicted demographic composition of communities changes, in 
response to changes in environmental quality.  Consider two demographic groups, Type 1 and 
Type 2. Assume that their conditional income distributions  and  are such that 
the mean income for Type 1 individuals is less than the mean income for Type 2 individuals.  
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the distribution of these demographic types in a 
system of two communities, with Community 1 having the lower (P, G) pair and 
Community 2 the higher.  All households to the left of 
)(yf ty
)(1 yf y )(
2 yf y
2,1Y  sort into Community 1, all to the 
right sort into Community 2.  Obviously, Community 1 has a lower average income than 
Community 2.  As shown in the figure, in this example Community 2 will have a much higher 
concentration of Type 2 individuals and Community 1 a much higher concentration of Type 1 
individuals.  Thus, Tiebout sorting with heterogeneity in income can induce correlations 
                                                 
27 It is straightforward to relax this assumption by introducing heterogeneity in tastes, so that there is 
heterogeneity of income within each community, but perfect stratification by tastes for each income (see Epple 
and Sieg 1999 and Sieg et al. 2004).  Accordingly, this assumption is not critical for the following implications 
of the model.   
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between other demographic groups (like race) and pollution.  (Nevertheless, while this 
correlation is guaranteed under the central case where the two distributions have identical 
higher moments, it need not occur in general.) 
The above results are completely expected given the model.  However, the 
comparative statics associated with a change in environmental quality in one of the 
communities is more subtle.  Consider the impact of cleaning up and reusing LULUs in the 
lowest G community in a system of two communities.  Evaluating the resulting demographic 
responses requires identifying the shift in the income boundary, 12,1 dGYd .  To evaluate 
this shift, we assume that housing demand is separable from G and apply the implicit function 
theorem to the boundary indifference condition and two market clearing conditions from 
equation (2).  This yields the following comparative static relationship: 
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where 
 ),,( 112,1
1 GPYVV = ,  
 ),,( 222,1
2 GPYVV = .  
D(.) is the household demand function, and subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
The key to signing the derivative in equation (3) is to recognize that the single 
crossing property implies that  implying that 0)( 21 <− yy VV 12,1 dGYd  is positive.28  
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of an increase in G1 on the equilibrium sorting.  In response to 
the change, the indifference boundary 2,1Y  moves to the right and the set of households in the 
shaded region A relocate from Community 2 to Community 1.  If G1 were to fall instead, or if 
                                                 
28 By the definition of Y , ),,( 112,1 GPYV  = ),,( 222,1 GPYV .  Since all those with incomes 
higher than Y  prefer Community 2, ),,( 112,1 GPYV ε+  < 0),,,( 222,1 >∀+ εε GPYV . 
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G2 were to increase instead of G1, an opposite shift would occur.  At the aggregate level this 
change leads to an increase in population for Community 1 and a decrease in population for 
Community 2.  (And to an increase in prices in Community 1 and decrease in Community 2.) 
What is the change in community 1's composition relative to community 2?  
Surprisingly, the model does not offer clear predictions.  Consider first the effect on income 
distributions.  As the bordering households move from Community 2 to Community 1, 
Community 1 gets richer.  (This follows from the fact that the moving households, shaded in 
Figure 2, are richer on average that the original residents of Community 1.)  We call this an 
absolute composition effect.  But meanwhile Community 2 loses its lowest income residents 
and therefore also experiences an increase in average income.  Thus, we have the counter-
intuitive result that increasing the level of G1 leads to an increase in average income for both 
communities!  So the relative composition effect is indeterminate.  Not surprisingly, the effect 
on relative racial composition is also indeterminate.  In fact, so is the absolute effect:  As 
Community 1 increases in average income, it does so by gaining the richer type I individuals 
as well as poorer type II individuals.  In general, the ratio of new type II to new type I 
individuals can be either greater or lesser than the existing ratio, so that the percent of type I 
individuals can increase or decrease.29 
We thus have three propositions.   
Proposition 1 (Scale Effect).  For any two communities, a marginal increase in public 
goods in one community relative to the other will cause population to rise in the community 
experiencing the improvement and to fall in the other community.   
Proposition 2 (Absolute Composition Effect).  Ceteris paribus, a marginal increase in 
public goods in any community will increase its average income.  The effect on the share of 
racial or other demographic groups is indeterminate.   
                                                 
29 As an example, consider a set of three minorities with incomes {10k, 30k, 50k} and a set of Whites with 
incomes {40k, 60k, 80k}.  These are two symmetric distributions differing only in the location parameter, with a 
higher mean for Whites.  Yet if 2,1Y  is initially at $45k and shifts to $55k, the composition of Community 1 will 
change from two-thirds minorities to three-quarters minorities.  
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Proposition 3 (Relative Composition Effect).  The change in the average income, or 
mean share of demographic groups positively correlated with income, in a community 
experiencing a marginal increase in G, relative to another community, is indeterminate.  
These results suggest that for small changes in Community 1’s environmental quality, 
there are no clear predictions for the relative change in community compositions.  The 
interpretation is even more complicated by the possibility that sometimes it is the nicer 
community, Community 2 in this example, which improves.  In that case, both communities 
would become poorer on average. 
These negative conclusions are mitigated by three factors.  First, in most cases it will 
be the less desirable communities (like Community 1) which host LULUs.  Second, if we 
consider a larger change—one that raises the level of environmental quality in Community 1 
above that of Community 2—clearer predictions arise.  Such a change will cause the 
populations in Communities 1 and 2 to switch places, resulting in an increase in average 
income in Community 1, while average income drops in Community 2.  Third, when we 
consider many communities instead of just two, the affect of a change in public goods in 
Community 1 will intuitively have the largest effects on the composition of close substitutes, 
with effects on other communities dampening out in the rank ordering (a pattern we have 
confirmed in simulations).  If these more distant communities act as a control group, we 
would expect to find a relative composition effect.  Thus, despite our inability to predict 
relative composition effects in general, there remain plausible reasons for expecting an 
increase in income among communities experiencing an exogenous improvement in public 
goods.  One might also expect a similar increase in the share of demographic groups 
correlated with income, such as race, but this remains purely an empirical matter. 
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Figure 1. Density of income for two household types and community income 
boundary. 
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Figure 2.  Shift in community income boundary after improvement in G1. 
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Figure 3.  The Four Sides of Environmental Gentrification 
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